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Literary Review
It was probably as difficult a
balancing act one could under-
take during a war. Show the Arab
raiders the benefits of restraint
and rudimentary Western mili-
tary strategy (e.g. the strategic
advantage that can occur from
NOT attacking, even if you are
sure to overwhelm) and teach
the rigid (to say the least) British
military the advantages of raid-
ing through guerilla attacks.
This was a time when “strate-
gic Western warfare” involved
crawling out of trenches and
marching directly toward your
enemy and hoping to win
through a different kind of attri-
tion – by forcing your enemy to
use all of its ammo. Of course,
that results in quite a few dead
soldiers and the killing fields
of World War I were some of
the most gruesome of any 20th
century war. Lawrence also had
to prove that “an active native
contingent, provided it was well
led, could achieve significant
military results against a conven-
tional army.”
Guerilla warfare was also ef-
fective over wide spaces. In the
Middle East, there really was no
such thing as “centralized battle”,
where two well-armed forces
stake out opposing plots of land,
size one another up and attack
accordingly. The idea of “trench
warfare” was not only foreign, it
was antithetical.
This type of warfare is similar
to the early rounds of a heavy-
weight fight, where one fighter
tries to soften his opponent for a
late-round knockout punch. Gue-
rilla warfare softened the Turks
and almost broke their will. But
almost was good enough with the
British army providing the late-
round knockout punch.
At one point, Lawrence – who
had undergone tremendous
physical strain and stress –
almost broke. It was after the
battle of Tafileh, in which a large
contingency of Arabs faced off
against a large body of the Turk
army. It was the first battle that
resulted in mass death – 600 out
of 1,200 Turks but only 30 out of
600 Arabs. There were also 300
Turkish POWs. Seeing the dead
that day struck Lawrence at his
core and pushed him to the brink.
After the battle and following an
incident of failed trust with one
of the Arab warriors, Lawrence
hastened to Allenby’s headquar-
ters to be relieved of his duties.
He felt he would be unable to
support the British offensive and
had lost faith in his warriors. “I
had no trick left worth a meal in
an Arab marketplace and wanted
the security of custom; to be con-
veyed; to pillow myself on duty
and obedience; irresponsibly.”
But when he met with Al-
lenby he swallowed his objec-
tions and could not refuse “the
Bull”. He would lead the Arabs
in the British offensive. Inciden-
tally, Lawrence wasn’t the only
beloved Brit who was beloved
by the Arabs. Allenby became a
hero and his name was adapted
to “Allah en Nebi”, which means
“Prophet from God”.
After the victory in Damascus,
Lawrence did something not
even our best military leaders
have been able to do – he created
a successful provisional govern-
ment that lasted without inter-
vention for two years. What’s
even more impressive is that he
did it literally overnight. Through
his authority and charisma he
was able to again unify the Arabs,
this time into a single govern-
ment body.
The book is highly researched
and written in a crisp manner
— with a story such as this it’s
best to let the words move the
story forward. After reading it,
I’m most struck by Lawrence’s
incredible charisma and his abil-
ity to gain the trust and respect
of multiple rival and warring
Arab factions. It makes one think:
what would have happened if a
“T.E. Lawrence” had showed up
among the Native Americans in
the early 1800s?
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